I guess the situation that comes to mind first is starting a war. Suppose the only alternative to Yalta would have been to start a war against the Soviet Union in 1945, which would have meant hundreds of thousands more deaths in Eastern Europe: would that have been an alternative to the rotten (or at least lousy) compromise of Yalta? Is it up to you to decide for others whether it’s better for them to die or live in chains? My point of view is that at that time, peace + Yalta was better than more war (if we assume for the sake of argument that a better compromise than Yalta was not feasible).

Likewise in Iraq: no doubts about Saddam, he was an inhuman dictator. But how many lives is freedom worth? I think it’s clear by now Bush’s invasion was a bad idea, but it is not necessarily a bad idea to intervene for humane reasons in all circumstances (think Rwanda).

Margalit’s point of view is that the rejection of a compromise should be taken on grounds which are solely derived from the nature of the other party. If this is an evil regime, like Hitler’s, Margalit thinks the compromise should be rejected. I doubt if this holds *without looking at alternatives*.

About death: you’re certainly right that death itself is not a true alternative; however choosing a course of action which will probably lead to ones death is.

My point was more that Grahame’s remark about not compromising in certain circumstances avoids the debate in a sense: the alternative for the Western powers after WW II to Yalta might have been a new war; this choice would mean more death and devastation in Eastern Europe, which makes it an unacceptable alternative to Yalta. Deciding it’s preferable to die than live in chains is in some ways an easier decision than to decide for others that it is better to die than to live. So Grahame’s remark in some ways blunts the dilemma: either Yalta or more terror on Eastern Europe. He sketches an acceptable alternative: fight on, even if it means death. I’m interested in those cases where there is no real acceptable alternative.

PS As death is the negation of existence doesn’t that disqualify it as a viable alternative let alone an acceptable one?

“there are some things where you don’t compromise, even in the absence of an acceptable alternative: better to die on your feet than to live on your knees”

- that makes death an acceptable alternative in those circumstances, doesn’t it?

But in principle, there are some things where you don’t compromise, even in the absence of an acceptable alternative: better to die on your feet than to live on your knees.